Saturday, January 07, 2006
Disinformation
Richard Miniter’s work, Disiniformation, is in itself, ironically, a work of disinformation. Though I could go chapter by chapter and refute Miniter, I have no desire to write a book to refute his. I will concentrate on one chapter, his allegations of Hussein-al-Qaeda cooperation. His major source is a series of articles written by Stephen Hayes for The Weekly Standard, with support from Deroy Murdock and Colin Powell’s speech to the UN.
Douglas Feith, head of the controversial Office of Special Plans, sent a classified memo to congress that contained a list and description of intelligence reports, a memo that was leaked to the media and became the foundation of Stephen Hayes’ reports in the Weekly Standard. Though Hayes described it as “detailed, conclusive, and corroborated by multiple sources,” Patrick Lang, former head of the Middle East section of Defense Intelligence Agency, called the Feith memo "a listing of a mass of unconfirmed reports, many of which themselves indicate that the two groups continued to try to establish some sort of relationship. If they had such a productive relationship, why did they have to keep trying?" in a Washington Post article critical of Hayes’ work. Daniel A. Benjamin, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former director for counterterrorism on the National Security Council staff, said of the memo "[I]n any serious intelligence review, much of the material presented would quickly be discarded." A November 2003 Newsweek article by Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball analyzes the work and considers it “shards of old, raw data that were first assembled last year by a tiny team of floating Pentagon analysts (led by a Pennsylvania State University professor and U.S. Navy analyst Christopher Carney) whom [Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J.] Feith asked to find evidence of an Iraqi-Al Qaeda "connection" in order to better justify a U.S. invasion.” In The Washington Post, former FBI counterterrorism analyst Matthew Levitt said of Hayes’ work: “A constellation of suggestions, however, still is not a convincing argument.”
Despite being panned by the Main Stream Media, not surprisingly, the right-wing media published positive reviews of Hayes’ work, most notably the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Times.
The assertions of Hayes, Murdock, and Colin Powell never proved true regarding al-Qaeda links to Saddam Hussein, al-Zarqawi’s links to Saddam Hussein, and similar allegations.
These allegations run contrary to all official reports. According to the U.S. Intelligence Agency’s Kerr Group Report of July 29, 2004, “[the U.S.] Intelligence Community remained firm in its assessment that no operational or collaborative relationship existed” between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. The 9/11 Commission reported the same finding. The Senate Intelligence Investigation Report reported the same finding. While all investigations turned up evidence of meetings between al Qaeda and Iraqi officials, none of them saw evidence of a “collaborative relationship.” As terrorism analyst Evan Kohlman points out:
While there have been a number of promising intelligence leads hinting at possible meetings between al-Qaeda members and elements of the former Baghdad regime, nothing has been yet shown demonstrating that these potential contacts were historically any more significant than the same level of communication maintained between Osama bin Laden and ruling elements in a number of Iraq's Persian Gulf neighbors, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Yemen, Qatar, and Kuwait.
So we begin the long, tiring journey into examining Richard Miniter’s sources regarding al-Qaeda and Iraq connections. Stephen Hayes is his primary source. The sources are covered in their order in Miniter’s Notes section.
Stephen Hayes, “The Connection” June 7, 2004
Hayes’ assertions about Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Hikmat Shakirv were discounted by intelligence experts, according to the Washington Post’s account. Even Hayes admits, at the end of this tale, “The Shakir story is perhaps the government's strongest indication that Saddam and al Qaeda may have worked together on September 11. It is far from conclusive; conceivably there were two Ahmed Hikmat Shakirs.”
He quotes a Newsweek article from 1999 that alleges that “Saddam Hussein…is reaching out to Islamic terrorists, including some who may be linked to Osama bin Laden” (emphasis added).
He quotes an ABC News story where unnamed sources alleged a meeting between Iraqi intelligence, a vague and unsubstantiated report. The fact that there were meetings between Iraqi intelligence and al-Qaeda is not in dispute.
Hayes then quotes an AP article than ran in the Washington Post without citation that also can be found here.
Very interesting. But bin Laden didn’t accept the offer, apparently.
So Hayes convincingly cites sources, including former CIA administrator Vincent Cannistraro, who prove that Iraq offered al-Qaeda asylum.
Hayes cites Clinton-era assertions of Iraq-al-Qaeda links regarding the Sudanese chemical plant that Clinton’s Administration attacked. His evidence of what was being produced at these plants is contradictory, as Hayes writes “For journalists and many at the CIA, the case was hardly clear-cut.” The Clinton Administration, without proof or citation, alleged an Iraq connection to the plant that was never proved by anyone.
The most damning evidence Hayes cites comes from documents captured by the Iraq Survey Group alleging bin Laden’s contacts with Iraqi intelligence in Syria (in the spring of 1992), a document alleging bin Laden was an “asset” of the intelligence, and another detailing a meeting with bin Laden and the Taliban about attacking American targets. He neither cites these documents nor proves that these meetings constitute a working relationship.
Stephen Hayes, “Nothing: What Michael Scheuer has to say about bin Laden and Saddam—and what that says about the CIA’s performance.” November 21, 2004
Hayes begins by criticizing MICHAEL SCHEUER, head of the CIA's bin Laden unit and until recently a senior analyst. He points out that in 2002 Sheuer’s book mentioned several instances of Iraq-al-Qaeda connections, again, connections that all inquiries into the matter have concluded didn’t amount to a working relationship.
Hayes again mentions the Clinton-era strike on the al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in the Sudan on August 20, 1998.
Hayes says that he considers it unlikely that Scheuer would have written a book alleging extensive al-Qaeda contacts based solely on open-source material, as he says.
Hayes rehashes his old arguments from “Connection” thusly:
We know that Iraqi Intelligence officials reported in 1992 that Osama bin Laden was an Iraqi intelligence an "asset" that had "good relations" with the Iraqi intelligence station in Syria. We know that Sudanese government officials met with Uday Hussein at bin Laden's behest in 1994 to discuss cooperation on bin Laden's behalf. We know that deputy Iraqi intelligence director Faruq Hijazi met with bin laden, at least twice. We know that Saddam agreed to air anti-Saudi propaganda on Iraqi national television. We know that the Iraqis considered the numerous "contacts" with bin laden a "relationship"--as revealed in their internal documents. We know that in the mid-1990s an internal Iraqi intelligence memo revealed that Saddam sought "further cooperation" with al Qaeda. And we know that meetings between high-level al Qaeda terrorists and senior Iraqi intelligence officials took place throughout 1998.
Again, all material that U.S. government investigations have concluded is circumstantial. Material that is “unsubstantiated.” On this basis Hayes maintains that Scheuer’s investigation into classified materials that didn’t substantiate a significant relationship between the two must mean that the CIA hasn’t been doing its job, that “Porter Goss has a big job to do.” And, apparently, Hayes knows how to do it.
Colin Powell’s Address to the UN Security Council February 6, 2003
The address can be found here. I find it amusing that Miniter cites Colin Powell as a good source for info on Iraq as Powell “was certainly not a cheerleader for war in Iraq.” Wow. That’s known as begging the question, Mr. Miniter. He also cites George “Slam Dunk” Tenet as his other reputable administration source (both page 108). And so, the long, hard slog into right-wing fucknuttery continues…
Miniter cites the Address as proof that “bin Laden met at least eight times with officers of Iraq’s Special Security Organization, a secret police agency” and “bin Laden met the director of the Iraqi mukhabarat, Iraq’s external intelligence service, in Khartoum in 1996,” and “an al Qaeda operative now held by the United States confessed that in the mid-1990s, bin Laden had forged an agreement with Saddam’s men to cease all terrorist activities against the Iraqi dictator.”
This is the address later intelligence analysis done by the Senate Select Intelligence Committee would conclude was based bad CIA intelligence, intelligence largely based on the lies of the defector Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, an al Qaeda agent captured by the U.S. and rendered to Egypt where he was tortured into giving a false confession. He later recanted his story, and the DIA and the CIA repudiated his story.
Stephen Hayes, “Body of evidence: A CNN anchor gets Iraq and al-Qaeda wrong. But will the network issue a correction?”June 30, 2005
Hayes criticizes CNN Anchors Carol Costello and Daryn Kagan for asserting there was “no connection between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein.” He maintains “The CNN claims are wrong. Not a matter of nuance. Not a matter of interpretation. Just plain incorrect.”
Hayes goes on to correctly point out that the 9/11 commission did conclude there were links, but then he amusingly mischaracterizes their conclusion himself. He says they “concluded only that there was no proof of Iraqi involvement in al Qaeda terrorist attacks against American interests.”
As Hayes himself has said:“Wrong. Not a matter of nuance. Not a matter of interpretation. Just plain incorrect.” The 9/11 commission went further than that and concluded there was no “collaborative relationship.”
Undaunted, Hayes continues, relating how “Jordan's King Abdullah explained to the Arabic-language newspaper al Hayat that his government had tried before the Iraq war to extradite Abu Musab al Zarqawi from Iraq. ‘We had information that he entered Iraq from a neighboring country, where he lived and what he was doing. We informed the Iraqi authorities about all this detailed information we had, but they didn't respond.’"
This of course, is to be expected, as U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that while Zarqawi was in central Iraq he used an alias. Following that he moved to Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq, beyond the Iraqi government’s reach. This is according to the CIA’s report in late 2004.
Hayes goes on to rehash his old intelligence, the intelligence about bin Laden in Syria in 1992 being listed as an Iraqi intelligence “asset,” the account of the non-aggression pact between al-Qaeda and Iraq in 1993, and the accounts of meetings in 1994 and 1995. Hayes goes on to characteristically quote the Senate Intelligence Committee out of context:
In 1997, al Qaeda sent an emissary with the nom de guerre Abdullah al Iraqi to Iraq for training on weapons of mass destruction. Colin Powell cited this evidence in his presentation at the UN on February 5, 2003. The Senate Intelligence Committee has concluded that Powell's presentation on Iraq and terrorism was "reasonable."
“Reasonable” in that it was reasonably based on bad intelligence, that is.
Hayes details another meeting between Iraq and al-Qaeda in 1998, and he reiterates the asylum offer allegation. Again, none of this was considered to constitute a “collaborative relationship” by the intelligence reviews that heard testimony and examined the documents.
Hayes proceeds to reiterate bad intelligence from 2002, citing the October 2002 National Agency report that alleged Hussein was funding al-Qaeda camps in Northern Iraq.
Stephen Hayes, The Connection
See my notes on The Weekly Standard article of the same name.
Iraq: Former PM Reveals Secret Service Data on Birth… May 23, 2005
This account records the assertions of Iyad Allawi, the leader of the Iraqi National Accord, a terrorist organizer whose killed about 100 civilians in terrorist attacks aimed to destabilize Hussein’s regime. Funny how some terrorists are “good” and others are “bad.”
He fed bad intelligence to the British and the U.S. in the run up to war. His “discovery” of documents now that he is in an influential position in Iraq led him to relate this story to this Arabic news outlet. Apparently, Hayes is taking Allawi’s word for it.
Stephen Hayes and Thomas Joscelyn, “Another Link in the Chain: The role of Saddam and al Qaeda in the creation of Ansar al-Islam” July 22, 2005
I question how many lies and mischaracterizations I have to catch Hayes in before he is effectively refuted in the eyes of his rabid, militia-member fan base.
Ansar al-Islam is the focus of this article. His central assertion is this: “The terrorists in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain are all connected--in one way or another--to the same Iraqi-based network which spawned the Kurdish-based group just 10 days prior to September 11, 2001.”
He quotes Le Monde, which published an unatributed assertion that Ansar al-Islam"was founded in 2001 with the joint help of Saddam Hussein--who intended to use it against moderate Kurds--and al Qaeda, which hoped to find in Kurdistan a new location that would receive its members."
This is surprising, considered that Mullah Krekar, the alleged leader of Ansar al Islam, rejects these claims.
He cites intelligence reporting of the same kind of contacts between Ansar al-Islam, and Saddam Hussein that were discounted by subsequent intelligence reviews. Hayes uses as his source material intelligence primarily gathered from CIA sources, information that also made its way into Colin Powell’s address to the UN.
Why Can't the CIA Keep Up with the New Yorker? Stephen Hayes, September 13, 2002
Hayes highlights Jeffrey Goldberg’s work in The New Yorker, which alleges Ansar al-Islam has received funds directly from Al Qaeda; that the intelligence service of Saddam Hussein has joint control, with Al Qaeda operatives, over Ansar al-Islam…” The links between al-Qaeda and Ansar al-Islam still seem accurate, but the intelligence linking this group to Hussein was discounted.
As usual, Hayes cherry-picks intelligence from the massive store that the CIA, NSA, and DIA released to the public, frequently in a highly-redacted form, and draws conclusions that his own sources eventually dispute.
“Saddam Hussein's Philanthropy of Terror,” Deroy Murdock, September 2004
Murdock, a fellow of the right-wing Hoover Institution, begins his story by citing unattributed and slightly exaggerated figures of Hussein’s reign of terror, alleging 400,000 victims.
He follows with a chart reproduced in Disinformation, detailing Hussein’s sponsorship of terror. His sources for Ansar al-Islam are Jonathan Landay “Islamic Militants kill senior Kurdish general” and Catherine Taylor’s “Saddam and bin Laden help fanatics, say Kurds,” from the Times of London, which largely cite the same Kurdish sources, discounted by U.S. intelligence reviews, who lied about such connections to encourage intervention from the U.S. to help them in their war against Saddam Hussein. He rightly cites some figures that are nevertheless misleading: Hamas, for example, is an umbrella organization that has legitimate political operations and health clinics. Hamas had an office in Baghdad. Thrown into this deceptive potpourri are mostly Palestinian groups whose ties to Saddam were no more extensive than their ties to every government in the Middle East.
Murdock documents the checks Hussein’s regime cut to the families of suicide bombers, done, according to Hussein, to help alleviate their pain and suffering and compensate for the loss of their homes, which were frequently bulldozed by the Israeli Defense Forces.
Murdock cites other instances of Iraqis who helped terrorists, including, strangely enough, Abu Nidal, whose organization figures prominently in the “Iraq sponsored” terror groups table. It is curious because, after Abu Nidal entered Iraq Saddam Hussein had him killed, though the Iraqi government maintained Nidal killed himself. Eventually, Murdock points this out, but alleges that because the Iraqi government couldn’t or wouldn’t capture Nidal for three years they were complicit in his activities (?).
This is the quality of Murdock’s report. He also cites other accounts of terrorists who operated in Iraq, including al-Zarqawi, whose case we have already covered.
Slogging further into this steaming mound of shitty writing…
Murdock goes on to cite the case of Salman Pak, yet another bit of intelligence that was discounted by the intelligence community. Salman Pak was allegedly a terrorist training site, according to some Iraqi defectors: Sabah Khalifa Khodada Alami (former Iraqi army captain), Abu Zeinab al-Qurairy (former brigadier general in the Mukhabarat), Khidir Hamza (scientist who was director of the Iraqi nuclear program), Abdul Rahman al-Shamari (a Mukhabarat agent in US custody), and "Abu Mohammed" (a former colonel in the Fedayeen). Their credibility was questioned due to their association with the Iraqi National Congress, the organization of Iraqi defectors from Iraq who hated Saddam Hussein and fed U.S. sources bad intelligence in the run-up to war. Inconsistencies in their stories led U.S. investigators to conclude they were untrue. No evidence has been disclosed about any intelligence finds at the camp after its capture, leading to doubt that anything was found.
Murdock goes on to reference Hayes in his account of Shakir, which has already been discounted by intelligence services per Hayes’ own caveat: it was a mix-up of names.
A judge by the name of Baer is covered next. I won’t dwell on a judge’s ruling.
Stephen Hayes “The Rice Stuff: Susan Rice talks about Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.” October 20, 2004
This tendentious article covers the case of al-Zarqawi. Again, we have covered this. Hussein never gave Zarqawi anything or harbored him.
See this wikipedia article for a well-cited rundown of refuted evidence linking Iraq to al- Qaeda and other terrorists.
Not to belabor the point, but the 9/11 Commission, the Senate Intelligence Investigation, and the Kerr Report all found the same thing: there was no cooperation between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. Defectors and witnesses who allege that there were had agendas and were lying. Intelligence reports seeming to confirm cooperation turned out to be false. These investigations were all more thorough, more exhaustive, and had more access to intelligence than Richard Miniter, Stephen Hayes, et al. But more importantly, they didn’t have a right-wing agenda.
This right-wing campaign to refute its own intelligence sources and prove Hussein was a terrorist mastermind are simply the desperate delusions of people seeking to justify the war in Iraq in their own minds. Hayes and Miniter get play on every FOX News channel and right-wing radio station. Regnery Press, the infamous imprint of the conservative movement, printed Miniter’s work. The Weekly Standard, the most right-wing of right-wing magaizines, printed Hayes’ work. This willingness to print and distribute misinformation is the defining characteristic of this right-wing media machine.
To quote Miniter’s dustjacket: You’ve been fooled.
# posted by BitterHarvest @ 12:53 AM 
